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Abstract—Recent years have seen an increase in the data 
usage in cars, particularly as they become more autonomous and 
connected. With the rise in data use have come concerns about 
automotive cyber-security. An in-vehicle network shown to be 
particularly vulnerable is the Controller Area Network (CAN), 
which is the communication bus used by the car’s safety critical 
and performance critical components. Cyber attacks on the CAN 
have been demonstrated, leading to research to develop attack 
detection and attack prevention systems. Such research requires 
representative attack demonstrations and data for testing. Ob­
taining this data is problematical due to the expense, danger and 
impracticality of using real cars on roads or tracks for example 
attacks. Whilst CAN simulators are available, these tend to be 
conﬁgured for testing conformance and functionality, rather than 
analysing security and cyber vulnerability. We therefore adapt a 
leading, industry-standard, CAN simulator to incorporate a core 
set of cyber attacks that are representative of those proposed by 
other researchers. Our adaptation allows the user to conﬁgure 
the attacks, and can be added easily to the free version of the 
simulator. Here we describe the simulator and, after reviewing 
the attacks that have been demonstrated and discussing their 
commonalities, we outline the attacks that we have incorporated 
into the simulator. 
Index Terms—controller area network, automotive cybersecu­
rity, in-vehicle network, simulation 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The connectivity of modern cars has made them vulnerable 
to many different types of attack. The Controller Area Network 
(CAN) bus, found in all cars and designed to be highly reliable, 
has repeatedly been demonstrated to be vulnerable to cyber­
attacks [1], [2], [3], [4]. Attacks have been demonstrated that 
incapacitate, disrupt or control car functions, or capture data, 
or provide misinformation to the driver or other systems. The 
CAN protocol lacks security features, such as encryption and 
authentication, that are now expected in computer networks 
and its vulnerability and appeal to hackers will increase as the 
autonomy and connectivity of vehicles increases. 
On the CAN reside the electronic control units (ECUs) 
that control the car’s performance and safety, making the 
CAN a prime target for automotive cyber attackers, who 
might be motivated by sabotage, theft, extortion, mischief, 
espionage and terrorism [5]. A number of attacking vectors 
have been documented. These include: compromised, illicitly 
reﬂashed ECUs; other devices attached to the CAN; and, 
external systems accessing the CAN via a gateway accessible 
through the OBD (On-board Diagnostics) port or IVI (In­
vehicle Infotaimment) system [3]. 
One proposed solution is the development of intrusion de­
tection systems for the CAN bus [6], [7], [8], [4]. Developing 
and testing an intrusion detection system requires the construc­
tion of representative attacks. Test data is needed to validate 
solutions, while system development requires an understanding 
of the data patterns signifying normal operation and attack 
manifestations. However, in the case of the automotive CAN, 
such data is difﬁcult to acquire. Staging CAN attacks on real 
cars is costly, dangerous, and should not be done on public 
roads. Moreover, the vast range of car makes, models and 
conﬁgurations, together with the variety of driving conditions 
and situations, makes repeatability a massive challenge. An 
approach taken by some researchers (e.g. [6], [7]), is to capture 
CAN log data and manipulate this to reﬂect the likely effects 
of an attack. This synthetic attack data is safe to generate, 
but has the disadvantage that it might not accurately capture 
the response to the attacks of the ECUs on the CAN. An 
intermediate approach is to carry out the attacks on a simulator 
(e.g. [8], [4]). This allows attacks to be cheaply developed and 
tested, and can produce CAN logs that capture the effects of 
the attack on the bus, including the CAN protocol processes. 
In this paper, we present a simulator for mimicking cyber­
attacks on the automotive CAN. Our simulator uses archetypal 
attack scenarios derived from published attacks and is built 
on industry leading CAN simulation software, ensuring repli­
cation of CAN protocol processes. The simulator offers the 
researcher a tool for testing and manipulating attack scenarios, 
as well as generating CAN logs for behaviour analysis and the 
development and testing of intrusion detection systems. 
Although some CAN simulators have been developed, they 
are typically conﬁgured for CAN conformance testing or 
functional testing, rather than for simulating attacks. For ex­
ample, neither the Vector Informatik’s CANoe V11 simulator 
[9], nor the OCTANE simulator [10] (both of which are 
discussed below) include CAN attack modules. We therefore 
extend Vector Informatik’s CANoe V11 simulator by adding 
an attack simulator that offers conﬁgurable archetypal attacks. 
These are representative of the attacks commonly proposed by 
researchers, and allow packets to be injected either in bulk or 
in response to speciﬁc events. Attacks can be mixed, as well 
as run across multiple conﬁgurations of the CANoe simulator. 
The user can also set the data values for each of the data ﬁelds 
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in the injected packets. Our simulator module can be used with 
the free demonstration version of CANoe and requires no extra 
programming by the operator. 
The contributions of this paper are: 
1) We present a CAN attack simulator that allows attacks to 
be modelled on a popular, industry-standard automotive 
CAN network simulator. 
2) We	 synthesise the published injection attacks into a 
representative set of archetypal manifestations, which we 
build into our simulator. 
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section II 
presents the anatomy of CAN attacks, including accessing 
the CAN, carrying out the attack, and detection options. This 
information is used to inform our simulations. The challenges 
of acquiring attack data for CAN cybersecurity research, 
testing and development are discussed in Section III, which 
also presents the motivation for the CAN attack simulator. Our 
simulator is compared to existing CAN simulators in Section 
IV and our simulator is described in Section V, with examples 
of attacks generated using it, presented in Section VI. Finally, 
we summarise our conclusions and considerations for future 
work in Section VII. 
II. THE ANATOMY OF AN ATTACK 
In this section, we discuss the structure of typical CAN 
attack and defence, and locate our contribution within that. 
We consider the following: the opportunities for accessing the 
CAN; the motives and options for carrying out the attack once 
access has been achieved; and, the effects on the bus trafﬁc, 
and the consequent implications for detection and defence. 
A. CAN Access 
To perpetrate any attack, the attacker will need to gain 
access to the CAN or its nodes. Although sub-networks in a 
vehicle should be protected by sufﬁciently secured gateways, 
this has been shown to not always be the case. Checkoway 
et al. [3], Hoppe et al. [4] and Tencents Keen Security Lab 
[11] have been able to bypass CAN gateways in production 
cars, as well as reprogram the gateway functionality. The ODB 
port has often been used to access the CAN in attacks (e.g. 
[12] [13] [4], [14]), though other access points have been 
demonstrated. Checkoway et al. [3] were able to inject packets 
onto the CAN bus via the car’s media player, as well as 
gain access to systems in the car via the car’s Bluetooth, FM 
RDS and Cellular systems, which they could then exploit to 
compromise the CAN ECUs. Miller and Valasek [15] remotely 
hacked a Jeep Cherokee via a cellular connection to its info­
tainment system, enabling them to inject CAN messages which 
controlled the steering, brakes, and acceleration. Koscher et 
al. [2] demonstrated situations in which CAN ECUs were 
illicitly reﬂashed via the OBD port, including whilst the car 
was being driven, and then used to stage subsequent attacks. 
They concluded that “many ECUs in our car deviate from their 
own protocol standards, making it even easier for an attacker 
to initiate ﬁrmware updates or DeviceControl sequences” [2]). 
What’s clear from these studies is that the impenetrability 
of the automotive CAN cannot be assumed. Access might 
be gained through inadequacies or imperfections in gateways; 
devices might be connected directly to the CAN; or internal 
ECUs might be illicitly reﬂashed to act a internal rogue 
units. Increases in connectivity, and the uptake of over-the­
air updating, are likely to present more opportunities for 
breaching. 
B. Attack Types and Their Bus Implications 
Whatever the mode of attack access, or the impact of the 
attack, the manifestation of the attack on the CAN bus can be 
broadly considered from two dimensions: a) the timing and 
triggering of the attack; and, b) the effect of the attack on 
message data contents. 
Attacks might be event triggered, such as in response to 
a broadcast from another ECU, or they might be triggered 
independently of all other events. Event triggered attacks, in 
which a vehicle was disrupted by the broadcasting of fabri­
cated packets, were devised by Hoppe et al. [4]. An example 
was the broadcasting of close-window packets whenever an 
open window packet was detected. The authors also broadcast 
other counteracting packets when an event such as a speed 
threshold was exceeded. They also devised attacks in which 
packets were broadcast at regular intervals such as spooﬁng 
periodic normality-check messages for an airbag that had 
been disconnected. Injecting a fabricated packet to disseminate 
false information, and counteract the legitimate information, 
is likely to need to be done at high rates in order to ensure 
the legitimate data is over-ridden. For example, Taylor et al. 
[6] tested attack injection rates of up to 10x the normal rate, 
lasting up to 1 second. 
Another class of proposed attacks that could be time trig­
gered, rather than event triggered, are attacks staged to happen 
when the car is likely to be switched off. Attacks with the 
ignition off might seem pointless at ﬁrst glance; however, 
Cho et al. [16] point out that some ECUs have a reserve 
power supply and will continuously monitor the system, even 
when the ignition is off. The authors report having been able 
to therefore start devices such as lights by injecting packets 
with the ignition off, thus creating malicious effects, such 
as draining the battery or re-conﬁguring CAN properties. 
Additionally, Valasek and Miller [12] found a Ford was unable 
to start if it had previously been ﬂooded with high priority 
packets whilst the ignition was off. 
Some attacks involve the fabrication of data content. 
Koscher et al. [2] demonstrated attacks that altered the legiti­
mate speed sensor readings, causing erroneous feedback on the 
dashboard. Miller and Valasek [1] staged a variety of attacks 
that required the broadcast of spoofed packets with fabricated 
data values that were plausible and capable of deceiving the 
reading ECU into believing the car was in a state different 
from the actual. For example, their attack which maliciously 
activated the Park Assist System and steering, required in 
addition the broadcasting of false speed and transmission 
readings. 
In some attacks the values of the attack packet payload are 
irrelevant or will be random. So called fuzzing attacks are 
often conducted to probe systems to determine weaknesses or 
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to determine what values might impart a speciﬁc response. 
For these, the data payload might be randomly generated in 
the hope that some of the values will produce an observable 
response. Fuzzing attacks are often conducted as a precursor 
to a more targeted attack. Lee et al. [13] determined the 
function of some CAN packets by systematically fuzzing one 
of the packet’s data ﬁelds while ﬁlling zeroes in the remaining 
data ﬁelds. They injected the fuzzed packets in batches of 
1000 for each ﬁeld that was fuzzed, with a gap of 10 msec 
between each injected packet. In another type of attack, denial 
of service (DoS), the contents of the data ﬁelds might be 
fully irrelevant; the aim being to inject high priority packets at 
sufﬁcient frequencies to hamper the broadcast of other packets. 
Such attacks were staged by Froschle and Stuhring [17], who 
point out that one of the attractions of these attacks is that they 
can be carried out with no knowledge of the CAN database. 
Although there is a broad range of attacks described in the 
above research, with a range of possible attack vectors; as 
we have discussed, their manifestation on the CAN bus can 
be summarised by their effects on the packet data payload, 
and by their effects on the packet broadcast rates. We are 
therefore interested in creating archetypal attack simulations 
that demonstrated these effects and enable control of their 
parameters; we discuss these in Section V. 
C. Prevention and Detection 
Modiﬁcations to the CAN bus to improve security have been 
proposed (see [18] for a summary). However, long car life-
cycles, industry standards formulation, and long production 
schedules are strong barriers to their development and adoption 
[19], [20]. Consequently, there has been research into devel­
oping post-production intrusion detection systems that might 
detect an attack (e.g. [21], [22], [23], [24], [6]), including some 
industry offerings [25], [26]. Proposals typically monitor the 
CAN packet trafﬁc to detect changes in packet broadcast rates, 
or anomalies in the packet data contents, since these are likely 
to be altered during the attack. 
Although signature based CAN intrusion detection has been 
proposed (e.g. [27]), and potentially offers advantages such 
as low false positive rates [28], the unpredictability of CAN 
attacks, as well as the awkwardness of reliably updating 
signature databases in cars, makes it unfavourable [20] [19]. 
In contrast, anomaly based intrusion detection systems tend 
to offer lower accuracy, but offer more scope to cope with 
attacks that might be difﬁcult to model or predict, as well 
as offering more self-learning capabilities and not needing 
signature database updates. Research papers offering CAN 
intrusion detection proposals are dominated by anomaly de­
tection proposals, usually employing machine learning [29]. 
These, in particular, require ample, valid, example data sets 
for training and testing. 
III. THE CHALLENGE OF CAN DATA COLLECTION 
The collection of sufﬁcient quantities of valid CAN data is 
a key problem in this domain. Anomaly based intrusion detec­
tion methods are developed using “non-polluted” data (CAN 
data that has not been subject to attack) and “attack data”, 
in which known attacks have taken place. Many researchers 
lack the resources to test representative attacks in a realistic 
environment. Staging CAN cyber-attacks on cars is clearly 
hazardous and potentially damaging to the car. An attack might 
disrupt the functioning of an ECU or force the car to operate on 
false information, causing damage and compromising safety. 
Understandably, it is illegal to stage attacks on public roads 
in most countries, and many researchers lack private track or 
rolling roads. 
The fact that new CAN attack possibilities to be investigated 
are still emerging ampliﬁes this lack of resources. The testing 
of attacks and solutions will need agile test rigs that can 
quickly, easily and safely be tailored to replicate evolving 
attack scenarios. 
Furthermore, the CAN dictionaries which are used to derive 
data values, packet IDs and broadcast patterns for a car model, 
are held conﬁdentially by the manufacturers for security and 
commercial reasons. Thus, whilst with patience, systematic 
testing, and reverse engineering, the meaning of some of 
the CAN IDs can be determined with reasonable accuracy, 
researchers are unlikely to know for sure the meaning of 
all of the data broadcast and might rely on speculations and 
assumptions about the data trafﬁc and payload. 
Another solution, and the one adopted most commonly 
by researchers, is to create “attack data” by gathering non-
polluted data from the car and manipulating it in a way 
considered to be representative of real attacks. The simplicity 
of this approach makes it appealing, but there are some issues. 
One drawback is that the CAN protocol processes may not be 
properly mimicked. For example, the CAN protocol includes 
arbitration processes that govern the access priority for packet 
broadcasts, as well as packet error processes that govern the 
termination and rebroadcasting of packets found to have errors. 
Additional complications are the broadcast characteristics and 
frequencies coded for each ECU. For example, Figure 1 
shows the CAN arbitration process captured in a log from the 
simulations we developed. Although algorithms for artiﬁcially 
manipulating CAN logs have been proposed (e.g.[6]), ensuring 
accurate replicating of such characteristics in an artiﬁcially 
manipulated log is difﬁcult. Also, since the CAN dictionary 
is unlikely to be known, the nature and outcome of the attack 
must remain speculative. A ﬁnal issue is that the readers that 
can capture accurate records of CAN logs (micro-second level) 
are expensive. 
An intermediate approach (and the one that we adopt) is 
the use of a simulator. In addition to their safety and rela­
tively low cost, these approaches enable rapid, systematically 
controlled testing where the attack parameters can be deﬁned 
and replicated across research projects and institutes. On the 
other hand, a simulation will always portray a simpliﬁcation 
of reality which, in the case of CAN testing, might mean a 
car system comprising fewer ECUs and a reduced coverage 
of driving situations. In spite of these drawbacks, simulators 
clearly offer a potential for cheap, rapid and safe testing and 
development at stages where testing using actual cars might 
be costly or impractical. 
The costs and beneﬁts of each approach are summarised in 
Table I. 
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Figure 1. Extract from the CAN log of a simulated attack showing the 
simulator has applied the CAN protocol arbitration process. Hexadecimal 
packet IDs are shown in column 3. The attack injected 5 messages for ID 67 
with data ﬁeld values FF FF. In compliance with the CAN arbitration process, 
lower value IDs (64 and 66) are still broadcast at their allotted times, delaying 
the broadcast of remaining packets for 67. 
Table I
 
APPROACHES TO CAN ATTACK DATA GENERATION.
 
Approach Disadvantage Advantage 
Actual vehicle Expensive. Validity - data 
attack Dangerous. 
Different cars and 
environments make 
cross-project 
replication difﬁcult. 
captured from an 
actual system. 
Manipulation 
of actual CAN 
logs 
CAN protocol 
processes may not be 
adequately mimicked. 
CAN dictionary 
unlikely to be known. 
The nature and 
outcome of the attack 
is speculative. 
Accurate capture of 
CAN logs requires 
expensive readers. 
Safe, with no damage 
to car. 
Potential for 
replication across 
projects. 
Known manipulations 
make data set labelling 
and testing easier. 
Simulator Simpliﬁed model. 
Systems are typically 
made for testing 
conformance and 
functioning rather than 
CAN attacks. 
Safe. 
Cheap. 
Potential for 
replication across 
projects. 
IV. RELATED SIMULATOR WORK 
As already discussed, there have been a few proposals 
for automotive CAN simulators. However, most of these are 
conﬁgured for testing conformance to the CAN protocol, or 
testing the functionality of ECU code. An attack using a CAN 
simulator was shown by Fowler et al. [30], who use custom-
made cables to connected a dongle to a powered testbed that 
included Vector’s CANoe simulator. Though the dongle they 
injecting CAN packets to turn the headlights on or off. CANoe 
was also used by Hoppe, Kiltz and Dittman [4] to demonstrate 
an attack which sent erroneous window control messages. 
Huang et al. [31] created ATG (Attack Trafﬁc Generation) 
which simulates CAN attacks. The tool supports a range of 
attacks, offers scripting for replicability, and is written to 
support adaptation and independent contributions. It requires 
a CAN hardware layer, for which they propose USB2CAN, as 
well as a conﬁguration of open Python libraries. 
Figure 2. The simulator adds an ECU attack node (Hack Node) to the existing 
CANoe ECU nodes. The attacks are instigated and controlled via this new 
node. 
Everett and McCoy [10] developed OCTANE (Open Car 
Testbed And Network Experiments), a hardware and software 
testbed that allows CAN packets to be monitored, so their 
functionality can be observed, and replayed, so their modiﬁ­
cation can be tested. The tool has a comprehensive architecture 
stack, enabling ﬂexible interfacing and adaptation. OCTANE 
does not simulate attacks, though in their testing of intrusion 
detection, Kang and Kang [7] adapted its logs to mimic the 
traces that might be generated in an attack. 
Although it does not emulate the CAN protocol processes, 
TORCS (The Open Racing Car Simulator) [32] offers car 
performance simulation that might be utilised in this ﬁeld. For 
example, it has been used to simulate the effects on engine 
component performance that might stem from an ECU chip 
tuning attack [8], as well as obtain physics-based feedback 
from a laboratory network of ECUs built to test an ECU code 
analyser [33]. 
Whilst tools such as the above offer potential, they require 
some effort in conﬁguration and integration, typically requir­
ing the integration of software stacks, APIs and hardware rigs. 
V. THE ATTACK SIMULATOR 
Our CAN Attack simulator is built on the CANoe simulator 
available from Vector Informatik [9]. To create and control the 
attacks, we add an additional Attack ECU (Hack_Node) on 
to the CAN network (Figure 2). 
The Attack ECU was created using Communication Ap­
plication Programming Language (CAPL), an event focused 
language developed by Vector Informatik to support their 
CAN tool-set [34]. To launch it the user opens our CANoe 
conﬁguration ﬁle using the CANoe File menu. It is conﬁgured 
to work in conjunction with the rest of the CANoe CAN nodes, 
and is controlled via an interface in order to launch selected 
attacks. The simulator contains a series of panels which are 
used to navigate through and operate each attack. Depending 
on the attack, our simulator provides the mechanisms for the 
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user to control the data values broadcast as well as control the 
size and timings of the packet injection load. While running 
the attacks the simulator retains a log of the CAN bus that 
can be used for later analysis. Multiple panels can be used 
simultaneously, thus allowing different attacks to be merged. 
These allow the user to study the effects on the simulator of 
the following types of injection attacks: 
•	 Targeted ECU Attack: broadcast of spoofed packets con­
taining speciﬁcally determined data values. 
•	 Counteraction Attack: broadcast of spoofed packets when 
their legitimate broadcast is detected. 
•	 Denial of Service (DoS): injecting of packets with high 
priority IDs. 
•	 Data-Fuzzing Attack: injecting packets with any permis­
sible data values. 
•	 Attack with Ignition Off: the effects, if any, of injection 
attacks can be tested while the ignition is off. 
We have developed the attack generator on the licensed 
version of CANoe, and if the user has access to a full Vector 
CANoe license the Attack ECU can also be transferred for use 
in other CAN networks. It can also be operated using a demo 
version of the CANoe software, although restrictions on the 
size of the network will apply. The attack simulator module 
is available on GitHub1. 
VI. ATTACK TYPES SUPPORTED BY THE SIMULATOR 
In this section, we present the types of attacks that can be 
generated using the simulator. 
A. Message injection 
The ﬁrst attack is a message injection attack which places 
a number of packets with a user deﬁned composition onto the 
CAN network. Message injection adheres to CAN protocol 
arbitration, with each message being injected as soon as the 
bus is available. To instigate the attack, the user ﬁrst selects 
the message ID that they are targeting, and then selects the 
number of messages that are contained within the attack, and 
assigns values to be used in the packet’s data ﬁelds. The attack 
can then be initiated. The user can attack the CAN bus as many 
times as desired. Figure 3 shows the message injection attack 
on the CAN ID responsible for engine speed. 
This is a simple attack conﬁguration, yet allows the user 
to test a variety of attacks that might seek to ﬂood the 
network (e.g. Overloading or DoS attacks) or target an ECU 
with packets containing fabricated values. We have created 
an additional variation of this attack that allows the user to 
specify the attack start time. 
B. Event-triggered action 
The second attack type is event based, and is triggered each 
time a speciﬁc message is intercepted by the Attack ECU. In 
response to this interception, the Attack ECU places a message 
onto the CAN bus with a composition chosen by the user. 
In the example in Figure 4 we re-perform the attack of 
Hoppe et al. in [4]. The passenger window is the attack target. 
1https://github.com/JakeHayward/Attack-ECU-Simulator-CANoe 
Figure 3. In the message injection attack the upper panel allows the user to 
select a message (ID 2 above), the number of instances to be injected (1000 
above) and their bit-wise composition along the bottom of the upper panel. 
The INITIATE ATTACK button sends the messages onto the CAN bus in 
adherence to the CAN arbitration policy. The simulation can be started and 
stopped using the controls in the upper right. The effects of the attack can be 
observed in the CANoe output in the lower two panels. The left panel shows 
an instantaneous view and the right panel (the historic view) shows reported 
engine speed which spikes at the point the attack takes place. 
Figure 4. The second attack panel instigates an event-triggered message 
injection attack. Shown here the attack injects “lower left window” messages 
whenever a “raise left window” message is detected on the CAN, thus 
preventing the left window from closing. 
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Figure 5. In the data display manipulation above, the upper panel controls 
an injection attack that manipulates the oil temperature sensor reading. The 
attack rebroadcasts oil temperature packets, but with increased dangerously 
hot temperature values (100 degrees, in the lower panel). 
When the attack is initiated the Attack ECU node will wait 
for the message ID that corresponds to raising the left-hand 
window of the vehicle. The attack node will then send out a 
CAN message that corresponds to lowering the window. This 
will cause the main ECU to receive a “lower window” mes­
sage immediately after it receives a “raise window” message, 
meaning the passenger window can’t be raised. During the 
simulation this attack is visually demonstrated in the animation 
of the vehicle built into the simulator. 
C. Data display manipulation 
The third attack (Figure 5) systematically increments the 
data values on a speciﬁc CAN ID, resulting in an inaccurate, 
changing sensor display. The attack uses the CAN ID that 
broadcasts the value of the vehicle oil temperature sensor. 
The simulation’s predeﬁned behaviour increments the oil tem­
perature from 0x00 to 0x4B (75 degrees). The temperature 
then goes to steady-state and remains constant throughout 
the rest of the simulation. The attack will appear to cause 
the oil temperature to increase over time. It does this by 
sending out CAN packets of the same ID but with a changing 
composition which incrementally increases the oil temperature 
to temperatures higher than the steady state of the simulation 
seen in Figure 3. 
D. Ignition off attack 
The purpose of this attack (Figure 6) is to explore the 
behaviour of the CAN bus when the ignition is switched off. 
When the ignition is off, a message is injected by the Attack 
ECU to determine if the remaining ECUs can receive and 
process CAN packets. Ignition off attacks on real vehicles have 
resulted in some ECUs being activated [12] or deactivated by 
Figure 6. The fourth attack panel enables an ignition-off injection attack to 
determine if an ECU will receive a CAN packet whilst the ignition is off. 
The message selection allows the user to select a message ID to use in the 
attack. 
being forced into a bus-off state [16]. This attack is similar to 
the attacks described in the ﬁrst attack, with the exception that 
it can be triggered when the ignition is off. The full attack is 
still under development, and attacks currently have a constant 
data value (0x01). This could be extended into a full fuzzing 
attack in which multiple IDs are targeted [30]. 
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
Simulating attacks, while not a replacement for thorough 
testing using actual cars and driving situations, is useful, 
cheap, safe, and can be systematically controlled. In this paper 
we have presented an attack simulator that extends an openly 
available, industry accepted CAN simulator by adding attack 
scenarios similar to those proposed by other researchers. The 
simulator faithfully replicates the changes in broadcast rates 
and timings that would result from the CAN arbitration process 
in an actual car. 
The simulator allows the real-time effects of an attack to be 
observed in the car’s body, engine and dashboard renditions, 
as well as in the graphical and numerical analysis tools built 
into CANoe. Perhaps, though, the most useful consequence 
is that it enables the easy generation of CAN log ﬁles that 
can be analysed or used for experimental data. Although the 
demonstration simulator we used has a smaller number of 
mimicked ECUs than would be found on a real car, further 
ECUs, including additional physical hardware nodes, can be 
integrated using a licensed version of the Vector CANoe 
simulator. 
One of the challenges we faced was in attempting to 
parameterize the selection of CAN IDs and attack variables 
to enable the quick and easy selection of permissible options. 
For example, specifying attack start times prior to starting the 
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simulation run, has proven trickier than we anticipated, though 
we will continue to explore options. 
Another area that we will continue to explore is the range 
of attacks replicated. The attacks we have have built so far are 
black box by nature —forcing change in the car functioning 
without concern of the internal functioning of the ECUs. 
Whilst this matches many of the attacks proposed and demon­
strated on real cars (such as those discussed in Section II), at­
tacks have also been proposed that force nodes into a dormant 
error-counter induced bus-off state by illicitly changing bit-
rates [16] or broadcasting fabricated erroneous messages [35]. 
The ECU source code and dictionary speciﬁcations provided 
in the CANoe simulation would offer scope to construct such 
attacks safely, and without the reverse engineering entailed 
in testing these attacks on real cars with unpublished node 
conﬁgurations. Also, as with monitoring other attacks, the 
simulation allows the the capturing of parameter values (such 
as the error counter values) as the attack progresses, facilitating 
an in-depth analysis of behaviours and responses. 
A natural progression of the simulator would be to interface 
it with experimental intrusion detection systems so that these 
can be tested in real time. The range of attacks should be 
also extended since at present our work focuses on packet 
injection scenarios. Reﬂashing has frequently been proposed as 
a method of tuning ECUs into attack vectors. The mimicking 
of reﬂashing effects, such as absent broadcasts during the 
reﬂash, or even the potential to stage a reﬂash of simulator 
ECUs, would be a useful exploration. 
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